

The Move to Global War

Two case studies · five questions · one hour. Q1a (3 marks · lift 3 facts) · Q1b (2 marks · message of a visual) · Q2 (4 marks · OPCVL) · Q3 (6 marks · compare AND contrast) · Q4 (9 marks · mini-essay using all 4 sources + own knowledge). Detailed paper-writing guide on the last page.

1 · Japan 1931–41 — Case Study 1

Causes NATIONALISM & MILITARISM · DOMESTIC ISSUES · INSTABILITY IN CHINA

JAPANESE NATIONALISM & MILITARISM

- Kokutai ideology + Pan-Asianism — Japan as liberator/leader of Asia from Western imperialism.
- Military increasingly autonomous: army acted independently at Mukden (18 Sep 1931).
- "Government by assassination" — Prime Minister Hamaguchi (1930), Prime Minister Inukai (1932); civilian moderates eliminated.
- Cabinet accepted League call to withdraw — army ignored it; civilian government broken by 1932.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN CHINA

- Nationalist (Guomindang) vs Communist (CCP) civil war absorbed Jiang Jieshi — he prioritised the Communists, not the Japanese.

- Manchuria left militarily exposed.
- Warlord era residue + weak central authority outside coastal cities.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL & ECONOMIC ISSUES

- **Depression after 1929** — silk <1/5 of 1923 prices by 1932; Smoot-Hawley up to 200% tariffs; rural starvation, urban unemployment.
- Population growing roughly one million per year — pressure for "living space".
- Manchuria offered: 4x Japan's land mass, coal, iron, timber, soybeans, market for Japanese goods.
- Existing footholds — Korea (1910), Liaodong, Port Arthur, South Manchurian Railway, Kwantung Army on the ground.
- Strategic logic — buffer vs USSR for Korea.

Events MANCHURIA 1931 · SINO-JAPANESE WAR 1937–41 · TRIPARTITE PACT · PEARL HARBOR

MANCHURIA · 1931–32

- **18 Sep 1931 — Mukden.** Kwantung Army stages explosion on SMR; pretext to invade. Tokyo cabinet accepted League call to withdraw — army ignored.
- **Feb 1932 — Manchukuo** declared, puppet state under Puyi.
- 1933–35 — Japan extends into Inner Mongolia & Northern China.

SINO-JAPANESE WAR · 1937–41

- **Dec 1936 — Xi'an Incident** — Zhang Xueliang and the Chinese Communist Party kidnap Jiang; force the Second United Front.
- **7 Jul 1937 — Marco Polo Bridge.** Minor clash → full war within weeks.
- Aug–Nov 1937 — Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai fall.
- **Dec 1937 — Nanjing Massacre** (200,000–300,000 killed). International outrage; no sanctions.
- By 1941 around one million Japanese troops bogged down in China → push south for oil, rubber, rice.

TRIPARTITE PACT · 27 SEP 1940

- Germany–Italy–Japan. European leadership to Germany & Italy, East Asia to Japan.
- Mutual defence vs any power not yet in either war — aimed at the United States.
- Predecessor: Anti-Comintern Pact (Germany & Japan, Nov 1936; Italy joined 1937).
- **Apr 1941 — Japan–USSR Neutrality Pact** frees Japan to move south, not against the Soviets.

PEARL HARBOR · 7 DEC 1941

- Yamamoto plan — knock out the US Pacific Fleet for six months to seize Southeast Asia. Doubted Japan could win a long war.
- 353 aircraft / 2 waves / 6 carriers. 07:48 local.
- Four battleships sunk; around 20 ships and 300 aircraft hit; 2,403 dead.
- **Missed:** 3 carriers (at sea), submarine base, oil tank farm (4.5 million barrels), drydocks. Each = why Japan lost.
- 11 Dec — Hitler unforced declaration of war on US fuses both wars.

Responses LEAGUE / LYTTON · SECOND UNITED FRONT · US INITIATIVES & US–JAPAN TENSIONS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS & THE LYTTON REPORT

- Oct 1932 — Lytton Commission arrives, almost a year after invasion; Japan already in control.
- Feb 1933 — League adopts Lytton Report 42–1: condemns Japan, calls for withdrawal (under Chinese sovereignty).
- **27 Mar 1933 — Japan walks out of the League.**
- No sanctions; no force. League credibility destroyed in its first great-power test.
- Hitler (took power Jan 1933) and Mussolini watching: lesson — the League doesn't bite.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN CHINA — SECOND UNITED FRONT

- Forced by Xi'an Incident (Dec 1936) — Jiang freed only on agreeing to fight Japan, not the CCP.
- Coalition between Nationalists (Guomindang) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against Japan; collapsed in practice in 1941 (New Fourth Army Incident).
- War hollowed the Guomindang; the CCP grew its rural base — setting up the Communist victory in 1949.

US INITIATIVES & RISING US–JAPAN TENSIONS

1932	Stimson Doctrine — non-recognition of Manchukuo; no action.
1935–37	Neutrality Acts — arms embargo on belligerents; aggressors & victims treated alike.
Oct 1937	Quarantine Speech (Roosevelt, Chicago) — moral isolation of aggressors; public hostile.
Dec 1937	USS Panay sunk by Japanese aircraft; Japan apologises, pays — crisis defused.
1938	Roosevelt stops applying Neutrality Acts to China; \$25 million oil loan to the Chinese Nationalists.
Jul 1939	1911 trade treaty terminated — opens door to embargoes.
1940	Embargoes on aviation fuel, scrap iron, machine tools.
Jul 1941	Asset freeze + oil embargo (after southern Indochina occupation). About 90% of Japan's oil cut; 18-month stockpile. Choice: retreat from China or seize Southeast Asian oilfields.
26 Nov 1941	Hull Note — full withdrawal from China & Indochina demanded. Treated in Tokyo as ultimatum.

KEY FIGURES · JAPAN

Emperor Hirohito — *Emperor of Japan 1926–1989*

Constitutional monarch; role in militarisation and war decisions still debated. Formally sanctioned war against the US in Dec 1941.

Hideki Tojo — *Prime Minister of Japan, Oct 1941 – Jul 1944*

Army general; hardliner who signed off on the Pearl Harbor attack.

Konoe Fumimaro — *Prime Minister 1937–39 and 1940–41*

Promoted 'New Order in East Asia' (1938); resigned when US talks collapsed Oct 1941.

Isoroku Yamamoto — *Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet*

Designed the Pearl Harbor attack despite doubting Japan could win a long war.

Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) — *Leader of the Chinese Nationalists (Guomindang)*

Prioritised fighting the Chinese Communist Party over Japan pre-1936; led the Second United Front after the Xi'an Incident.

Mao Zedong — *Leader of the Chinese Communist Party*

Grew the Communist base in the countryside during the war; positioned for the 1949 victory.

Franklin D. Roosevelt — *US President 1933–45*

Shifted US from isolation to active deterrence; froze Japanese assets July 1941.

Cordell Hull — *US Secretary of State*

Author of 1941 'Hull Note' Japan read as ultimatum.

Lord Lytton — *British diplomat*

Headed League commission whose 1932 report condemned Japan.

THEMES & ESSAY ANGLES · JAPAN

Push vs pull (causes)

- **Push:** Depression collapse of silk & rice prices, rural starvation, population pressure (roughly one million per year), civilian government broken, military autonomy.
- **Pull:** Manchurian resources (4x Japan's land mass; coal, iron, soybeans), weak fragmented China, USSR buffer logic for Korea, prestige.

Why China couldn't resist before 1937

- Jiang Jieshi prioritised the Communists — "*first internal pacification, then external resistance*".
- Warlord remnants and weak central authority outside the coastal cities.
- Xi'an Incident (Dec 1936) forced the Second United Front; full war then came at Marco Polo Bridge (Jul 1937).

North strike vs south strike (1940–41)

- Army faction wanted to attack the Soviet Union (north); navy wanted Southeast Asia (south, oil).
- Khalkin-Gol defeat by the Soviets (Aug 1939) and the Nazi-Soviet Pact discredited the north strike.
- Apr 1941 Japan-USSR Neutrality Pact + Jul 1941 South Indochina occupation → south road locked in.

Decision points (turning forks)

- **1931–32:** Tokyo cabinet ceded to the Kwantung Army at Mukden; civilian government broken thereafter.
- **1933:** Japan walked out of the League rather than accept the Lytton Report.
- **1937:** Marco Polo Bridge — Konoe chose escalation; "annihilate" the Nationalists in 3 months. Quagmire instead.
- **Jul 1941:** S. Indochina occupation triggered the US oil embargo — reversible only by withdrawal from China.
- **Nov 1941:** Hull Note + 18-month oil stockpile → strike now or yield. Yamamoto: knock out Pacific Fleet for 6 months, then negotiate.

Common Paper 1 question angles

- "To what extent was Japanese expansion driven by economic crisis 1931–41?" — Depression vs ideology vs militarism.
- "How effective was the international response to Japanese aggression 1931–37?" — League toothless, USA passive (Stimson, Neutrality Acts).
- "Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor in December 1941?" — oil embargo, Hull Note, Yamamoto plan, Tripartite logic.
- "To what extent was Japanese foreign policy decided by the military rather than the civilian government?" — assassinations, Mukden, Manchukuo.

2 • Germany & Italy 1933–40 – Case Study 2

Causes FASCISM & NAZISM • DOMESTIC ECONOMY • DIPLOMATIC ALIGNMENTS & APPEASEMENT

IMPACT OF NAZISM ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY – HITLER'S AIMS

1. Revise / destroy the Treaty of Versailles (clause-by-clause).
2. Unite all ethnic Germans into one Reich (Volksgemeinschaft → Grossdeutschland).
3. Expand eastwards to achieve Lebensraum (living space) at Slavic/Soviet expense.
4. Defeat 'Judeo-Bolshevism' – racial-ideological war against USSR (long-term).
 - **Mein Kampf (1925)** – explicit programme: destroy Versailles, unite Germans, Lebensraum east, racial war on USSR.
 - **Hossbach Memorandum (5 Nov 1937)** – Hitler tells service chiefs Germany must seize Lebensraum by 1943–45.
 - Popular support – every German party rejected Versailles; early moves framed as self-determination.

IMPACT OF FASCISM ON ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY – MUSSOLINI'S AIMS

1. Rebuild the Roman Empire – 'Mare Nostrum' (the Mediterranean as Italy's sea).
2. Gain prestige (spazio vitale) to distract from economic weakness at home.
3. Export Fascism; weaken communism (anti-Bolshevism).
4. Redress the 'mutilated victory' of Versailles – expand into Africa and the Balkans.
 - Drew on Roman imagery – Mediterranean = *Mare Nostrum*. Resented British naval dominance (Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Suez) + "mutilated victory" of 1919.
 - Foreign aggression as distraction from economic weakness at home.

DOMESTIC ECONOMIC ISSUES – BOTH REGIMES

Germany

- Depression unemployment (six million by 1932) drove the Nazi rise; rearmament absorbed unemployment.
- **Four-Year Plan (1936)** under Goering – autarky & war economy by 1940.
- Mason's thesis: by 1938–39 economy overheated; rearmament outpacing labour/raw materials → "flight into war".
- Counter (Overy): Nazi economy was functioning; war was chosen, not forced.

Italy

- Italian economy around one-fifth the size of Germany's; about 80% of oil, coal and steel imported.
- Autarky drive ("battle for grain", "battle for the lira") fell short.
- Few modern weapons by 1939; navy lacked carriers.
- Junior-partner role was the only affordable foreign policy – rhetoric concealed the gap.

END OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY • APPEASEMENT

Era arc: Locarno (1925) cooperation → Kellogg-Briand (1928, no teeth) → Disarmament Conference fails (1934) → Stresa (Apr 1935) collapses within months (Anglo-German Naval Agreement Jun 1935) → Rome-Berlin Axis (Oct 1936) + Anti-Comintern (Nov 1936) → Munich (Sep 1938, USSR excluded) → Prague (Mar 1939) breaks appeasement → Nazi-Soviet Pact (Aug 1939) ends collective security.

Appeasement – five drivers: (1) economic constraint; (2) imperial overstretch (three-front threat – 1937 Joint Planning Committee); (3) First World War trauma & public opinion (1933 Oxford Union 275–153, 1935 Peace Ballot 11 million); (4) moral view that parts of Versailles were unjust; (5) anti-communism (Halifax 1937: Germany "a bulwark against Bolshevism").

Events GERMAN CHALLENGES 1933–38 • ITALIAN EXPANSION • GERMAN EXPANSION 1938–39 + PACTS

GERMAN REARMAMENT • 1933–35

- **Oct 1933** – leaves Disarmament Conf. + League.
- **16 Mar 1935** – conscription announced; Wehrmacht target 550,000. Luftwaffe revealed.
- **Apr 1935** – **Stresa Front** – Britain, France & Italy jointly condemn German rearmament.
- **Jun 1935** – **Anglo-German Naval Agreement** – Britain accepts German fleet at 35% of the Royal Navy. Splits Stresa.

RHINELAND • 7 MAR 1936

- About 22,000 troops; orders to retreat at any French resistance. France mid-election; General Gamelin inflated German strength to 300,000.
- British attitude: "Germans going into their own back garden."
- Hitler later: "*The 48 hours... the most nerve-wracking of my life.*"
- → Locarno dead; Belgium drops the Franco-Belgian alliance; France can no longer threaten Germany to defend its Eastern allies (Poland, Czechoslovakia).

ANSCHLUSS • 12 MAR 1938

- 1934 attempt failed – Mussolini sent 4 divisions to Brenner. By 1938 Italy was an ally.
- Schuschnigg bullied at Berchtesgaden (12 Feb) → plebiscite cancelled → resigned.
- "Invitation" telegram from Seyss-Inquart drafted by Goering in Berlin.
- Plebiscite 10 Apr – 99.7% yes (rigged).
- Adds seven million people, iron ore, currency reserves; Czechoslovakia surrounded on three sides.

SUDETEN / MUNICH • 29 SEP 1938

- Three million Sudeten Germans. Hitler told Henlein to keep raising demands so they couldn't be met.
- Chamberlain shuttle: Berchtesgaden (15 Sep) → Bad Godesberg (22–23 Sep) → Munich (29 Sep).
- Conferees: Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini. **Czechs not invited; USSR excluded.**
- Czechoslovakia loses Sudeten mountain defences, 70% of iron/steel, 70% of electricity, Skoda works.
- Chamberlain at Heston: "*peace for our time.*"

PRAGUE · 15 MAR 1939 — APPEASEMENT BREAKS

- Hácha bullied into "requesting" German protection. Bohemia/Moravia → Reich protectorate; Slovakia puppet state.
- First non-German territory taken — kills the self-determination defence.
- 31 Mar — Anglo-French guarantee to Poland. April — conscription introduced (first peacetime); USSR talks opened.

ABYSSINIA · 1935–36

- **Why:** revenge for Adowa (1896); land/minerals/space; prestige to distract from Depression; Stresa tacit licence.
- **3 Oct 1935** — invasion from Eritrea + Italian Somaliland. Mustard gas used.
- League: aggressor under Art. 16. Sanctions on arms, loans, some goods. **Not oil, coal, steel; Suez stayed open.**
- **Dec 1935** — **Hoare-Laval Pact leaked** — secret offer of roughly two-thirds of Abyssinia to Italy; both ministers resign.
- **5 May 1936** — Italians enter Addis Ababa. Annexation 9 May. Sanctions lifted Jul 1936.
- 30 Jun 1936 — Selassie at the League: "*It is us today, it will be you tomorrow.*"
- → League finished as security body; Stresa dead; Italy → Axis (Oct 1936) + Anti-Comintern (Nov 1937).

SPAIN · ALBANIA · ITALY ENTERS WWII

- **1936–39 Spanish Civil War** — about 75,000 troops (Italian Volunteer Corps) + 660 aircraft to Franco; cost roughly 14 billion lire.
- Mar 1937 — **Guadalajara:** Italians routed by Republicans (incl. anti-Fascist Garibaldi Battalion).
- Franco wins 1939 but stays neutral 1939–45.
- **7 Apr 1939** — Italy invades Albania; Zog flees; V.E. III "King of Albania".
- **22 May 1939** — **Pact of Steel:** full offensive-defensive alliance, **no escape clause.** Ciano regrets it. General Staff: Italy can't fight major war before 1943.
- **Sept 1939** — "non-belligerence". **10 Jun 1940** — declares war as France collapses ("*a few thousand dead to sit at the peace conference*"). Greece & N. Africa disasters follow.

NAZI-SOVIET PACT · 23 AUG 1939

- Public: 10-year non-aggression. Secret: partition of Poland (Narev/Vistula/San); Soviet sphere over Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Bessarabia (Lithuania added later).
- Stalin: Munich convinced him West won't fight — bought time + territory. Hitler: avoided two-front war.
- **1 Sep** — Gleiwitz incident faked; Poland invaded. Britain and France declare war 3 Sep. USSR invades from the east 17 Sep.

Responses BRITAIN · FRANCE · USA · USSR · 1933–38 · 1935–36 · 1940

TO GERMAN AGGRESSION · 1933–38

- 1933 — Britain & France formal protests as Germany leaves the League; no action.
- Apr 1935 — Stresa Front; Jun 1935 — Anglo-German Naval Agreement splits it (Britain unilaterally legitimised German rearmament).
- Mar 1936 — Rhineland: no Allied response. Locarno dead.
- Mar 1938 — Anschluss: verbal protests only.
- Sep 1938 — Munich: Sudetenland ceded; USSR excluded throughout.
- USA: Stimson Doctrine + Neutrality Acts — passive on Europe.

TO ITALIAN AGGRESSION · 1935–36 (ABYSSINIA)

- League: Italy aggressor (Art. 16). Sanctions on arms, loans, some goods.
- **Critical omissions:** no oil; no coal/steel; Suez stayed open.
- British rationale — fear of pushing Mussolini towards Hitler. French rationale — preserve Stresa.
- Hoare-Laval (Dec 1935) leak — both ministers resigned.

- USA — Neutrality Act applied to both; US oil exports to Italy actually rose.

TO GERMAN & ITALIAN AGGRESSION · 1940

- By 1940 the response was war. Britain and the Commonwealth fight alone after France's collapse (22 Jun 1940).
- USA materially anti-Axis: cash-and-carry (Nov 1939), Destroyers-for-Bases (Sep 1940), Lend-Lease (Mar 1941, \$50bn+).
- USSR bound by Nazi-Soviet Pact — still trading with Germany at Barbarossa (22 Jun 1941).
- Pearl Harbor (7 Dec 1941) + Hitler's 11 Dec declaration end US neutrality, fuse the wars.

USSR · PIVOT TO THE PACT

- 1934 joins League. May 1935 — Franco-Soviet + Soviet-Czech pacts. Litvinov pushes collective security.
- Sep 1938 — Munich excludes USSR. Stalin concludes the West won't deal with Moscow.
- 3 May 1939 — Litvinov → Molotov. 23 Aug — Nazi-Soviet Pact.

KEY FIGURES

Germany

Adolf Hitler — Chancellor 1933; Führer 1934
Personally directed all major decisions from 1938.

Joachim von Ribbentrop — Foreign Minister 1938–45

Signed Nazi-Soviet Pact; hardliner.

Konstantin von Neurath — Foreign Minister 1932–38

Conservative; replaced after Hossbach meeting for being too cautious.

Hermann Göring — Luftwaffe chief; Four-Year Plan

Drafted Anschluss telegram; managed war economy.

Kurt Schuschnigg — Austrian Chancellor 1934–38

Tried plebiscite on Austrian independence — forced to resign.

Edvard Beneš — Czechoslovak President

Excluded from Munich; resigned after it.

Józef Beck — Polish Foreign Minister

Refused Hitler's Danzig demands.

Italy

Benito Mussolini — Duce of Fascism; Prime Minister 1922–43

Took personal control of foreign policy after 1932.

Galeazzo Ciano — Foreign Minister 1936–43 (Mussolini's son-in-law)

Signed the Pact of Steel; later opposed the war and was executed in 1944.

Victor Emmanuel III — King of Italy

Symbolically ruled over the empire: Italy, Ethiopia, Albania.

Pietro Badoglio — Chief of the General Staff 1925–40

Conquered Addis Ababa 1936; later led the armistice government in 1943.

Samuel Hoare & Pierre Laval — British Foreign Secretary & French Prime Minister
Resigned after the Dec 1935 pact leak.

Francisco Franco — Spanish Nationalist leader

Took Italian aid but stayed neutral 1939–45.

Britain / France / USA / USSR

Neville Chamberlain — British Prime Minister 1937–40

Architect of active appeasement; pivot to deterrence after March 1939.

Winston Churchill — Backbench MP through the 1930s

Chief critic of appeasement; Prime Minister from May 1940.

Édouard Daladier — French Prime Minister 1938–40

Signed Munich privately believing it was a failure.

Franklin D. Roosevelt — US President 1933–45

Gradually dismantled isolation; architect of Lend-Lease.

Maxim Litvinov — Soviet Foreign Minister 1930–39

Collective security advocate; replaced May 1939.

Vyacheslav Molotov — Soviet Foreign Minister 1939–49

Signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

Haile Selassie — Emperor of Ethiopia

1936 League speech: 'It is us today, it will be you tomorrow.'

THEMES & ESSAY ANGLES · GERMANY & ITALY

Hitler — blueprint or opportunist?

- **Blueprint reading:** *Mein Kampf* (1925) + Hossbach Memorandum (1937) lay out destroy-Versailles, unite Germans, Lebensraum east, racial war on USSR.
- **Opportunist reading:** Rhineland (1936) and Anschluss (1938) exploited French/British weakness; Munich was Chamberlain's plan as much as Hitler's.
- **Synthesis:** long-term aims fixed; tactics improvised against opponents who refused to enforce Versailles.

Mussolini — junior partner or equal aggressor?

- Stresa 1935 → Axis Oct 1936 → Pact of Steel May 1939 → war Jun 1940: a steady subordination to Berlin.
- Italy too poor for the wars Mussolini wanted: Ethiopia drained reserves; ~80% of oil/coal/steel imported; few modern weapons by 1939.
- Albania, Greece, North Africa exposed the gap between rhetoric (*Mare Nostrum*, eight million bayonets) and capability.

Why the League collapsed — Manchuria → Abyssinia

- 1931–33 Manchuria — no sanctions, no force; Japan walked out without cost.
- 1935–36 Abyssinia — sanctions but no oil, no coal/steel, Suez open; Hoare-Laval leak exposed Anglo-French double game.
- By 1936 the League was finished as a security body; Hitler watching.

When did appeasement fail?

- **Mar 1936 (Rhineland):** last cheap chance to stop Hitler with overwhelming force; France did not move.
- **Sep 1938 (Munich):** Czech mountain defences, 70% of iron/steel, 70% of electricity, the Skoda works surrendered

without a shot.

- **Mar 1939 (Prague):** first non-German territory taken — kills the self-determination defence; appeasement abandoned in fact (Polish guarantee, conscription, USSR talks).

The five drivers of British appeasement

- Economic constraint — rearmament cost vs Depression budgets.
- Imperial overstretch — 1937 Joint Planning Committee: cannot fight Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously.
- First World War trauma + public opinion — 1933 Oxford Union 275–153 against fighting; 1935 Peace Ballot 11 million signatures.
- Moral revisionism — parts of Versailles seen as unjust (especially the German-speaking border lands).
- Anti-communism — Halifax 1937: Germany "a bulwark against Bolshevism" in Europe.

Common Paper 1 question angles

- "To what extent was Hitler's foreign policy a continuation of earlier German aims?" — Versailles revision vs Lebensraum break.
- "How far was appeasement responsible for the outbreak of war in 1939?" — vs Hitler's aims, vs French weakness, vs Soviet exclusion.
- "Why did the League of Nations fail to respond effectively to Italian aggression in Abyssinia?" — sanctions gaps, Stresa logic, Hoare-Laval.
- "Compare and contrast the foreign policies of Hitler and Mussolini 1933–40." — aims, methods, dependence.

3 • How to write Paper 1

Q1 (a)	3 marks • 5 minutes	Three separate facts/inferences from one source. No analysis. Markscheme: one mark per clear distinct point.
Q1 (b)	2 marks • 3 minutes	Message of a cartoon/visual — symbol + caption based. Markscheme: two clearly-stated messages.
Q2	4 marks • 10 minutes	OPCVL on one source — 2 values + 2 limitations. Markscheme caps marks if values/limitations not rooted in Origin / Purpose / Content.
Q3	6 marks • 12 minutes	Compare AND contrast — both required . About 3 similarities + 3 differences. Cite letters. Markscheme: missing one half caps at 4 out of 6.
Q4	9 marks • 25 minutes	Mini-essay: thesis + body paras, ALL 4 sources + own knowledge. Markscheme rewards: focus, integration, judgement (not summary).

Q2 • OPCVL framework

- **O — Origin.** Who, when, where, type. Contemporaneous vs retrospective.
- **P — Purpose.** Why produced? Audience? Public speech vs cabinet memo vs diary.
- **C — Content.** What it says/shows. Tone, omissions, emphasis.
- **V — Two Values,** each rooted in O / P / C. e.g. "As an internal cabinet memo (O), reveals private anxieties not expressed publicly (V)."
- **L — Two Limitations,** also rooted in O / P / C. Specific, not generic ("biased").

Markscheme tell: generic "all sources are biased" caps at about 1 out of 4. Anchor each value/limitation to a specific Origin/Purpose/Content feature of **this** source.

Q3 • compare & contrast

- **Both halves required** — markscheme caps at 4 out of 6 if one is missing.
- About three similarities + three differences. Run-on prose, not a list.
- Cite source letters: "Source A and Source B both..."
- Compare content + tone + perspective, not surface detail.

Source types — quick OPCVL

Source	Value	Limitation
Lytton Report	Independent on-the-ground investigation	Anglo-French dominated; politically softened
Hossbach Memorandum	Senior military record of aggressive intent	Summary, not transcript; written from memory five days later
Roosevelt speeches	President's real concerns despite formal US neutrality	Trial balloons, not policy; rhetorical inflation
Chamberlain "peace for our time"	Public face of appeasement	Private letters show less confidence
Churchill 1930s	Dissenting view in real time	Opposition amplifying the danger
Mussolini speeches	Public Fascist project in his own words	Heavy rhetorical inflation, not sober policy
Ciano diary	Insider on Mussolini's thinking	Written for posterity; distancing tone post-1940
Haile Selassie 1936 League speech	Eyewitness victim testimony at the League	Rhetorical; revealed nothing Britain or France didn't already know
Japanese memoirs	Insider account of Pacific decisions	Self-exculpatory; written under US occupation
Political cartoons	Public mood and propaganda	Cartoonist's politics; symbolic, not literal
Nazi-Soviet secret protocol	Real intent behind the public pact	Hidden until 1989 — unknown to contemporaries

- Linking: *likewise, similarly, however, in contrast, whereas.*
- No own knowledge — source-only.

Q4 • mini-essay

1. Introduction one to two lines — direct thesis.
2. About three body paragraphs: own knowledge → integrate two sources by letter → mini-judgement.
3. Use ALL FOUR sources. Forgetting one = capped at the level below.
4. Weave sources as evidence; don't summarise them.
5. Brief conclusion: restated judgement, weighted.

Time budget • 1 hour

5 min	Read all four sources + all four questions. Annotate sources for OPCVL while reading.
5 min	Q1a (3 marks) — three separate points.
3 min	Q1b (2 marks) — two messages of the visual.
10 min	Q2 (4 marks) — OPCVL: two values + two limitations.
12 min	Q3 (6 marks) — compare AND contrast.
25 min	Q4 (9 marks) — mini-essay: thesis + 3 body + judgement, all four sources + own knowledge.